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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0) (2009). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The City agrees with issues one, four and five in Mr. van Frank's opening brief. 
The City objects to issues two and three. The trial court's Memorandum Decision did not 
determine "that portions of Mr. van Frank's declaration are not properly supported for 
purposes of summary judgment." The Memorandum Decision also did not "determine^ 
that a letter written by the Director of the City's Building Services Division . . . is 
hearsay." 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court simply recited the City's contentions 
in opposition to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 244-45. It made no 
ruling on those contentions. Instead, the court indicated that it would deny Mr. van 
Frank's motion based on the parties' factual disputes, but in light of its ruling granting the 
i 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court held that Mr. van Frank was not entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City does not dispute paragraphs one, three, four and five of Mr. van Frank's 
Statement of the Case. The City does dispute paragraph two of Mr. van Frank's < 
Statement of the Case. That paragraph consists of legal argument which has no place in 
the statement of the case. It should be stricken, or at the very least, disregarded by this 
( 
Court. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RESPONSE TO MR. VAN FRANK'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City disputes the following paragraphs of Mr. van Frank's Statement of Facts: 
Paragraph 6: It is understood by Mr. van Frank and admitted to by the City that the 
permit was conditionally denied by the Division based upon Mr. van Frank's calculations 
but subsequently approved without change to the plans. 
RESPONSE: This Statement of Fact is only partially correct. The part of the 
record to which Mr. van Frank cites in support of this statement (R. 53) is the second 
page of the City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
fifth paragraph of the statement of facts in the City's Motion states "Mr. Buchanan's 
application for a building permit was denied, at least in part, because the City required a 
structural engineer's opinion regarding certain calculations made by van Frank in his 
drawings and/or certifying the safety of the building design." 
Paragraph 7: The Division made a determination that Mr. van Frank's 
calculations exceeded the scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect 
under state law and the Division required Mr. Buchannan to provide the opinion of a 
structural engineer to certify the accuracy of Mr. van Frank's calculations. 
RESPONSE: Again, this Statement of Fact is only partially correct. It is true that 
the City required the opinion of a structural engineer before it would approve Mr. 
Buchannan's building permit application. The remainder of this paragraph has no 
support whatsoever in the record. The only part of the record cited by Mr. van Frank (R. 
53) that has any bearing on this statement of fact is paragraph 6, which states "Mr. 
Buchannan obtained the required opinion of a structural engineer certifying that the floor 
2 
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system designed by Mr. van Frank was safe." At no time in this litigation has Mr. van 
Frank ever cited to any admissible evidence in the record to support his allegation that the 
Division made any determination of any kind regarding Mr. van Frank's licensure as an 
architect, the scope of practice allowed Mr. van Frank under state licensing law, or took 
any action whatsoever regarding his architect's license. At most, the factual record 
demonstrates that the Division required the opinion of a structural engineer to certify the 
safety of the proposed building design before it would approve Mr. Buchanan's 
application for a building permit. 
Paragraph 9: A year prior to doing work for Mr. Buchanan, Mr. van Frank 
contracted with a Mr. Thomas to perform architectural work. It is the understanding of 
Mr. van Frank that the Division conditionally denied a building permit submitted by Mr. 
Thomas on grounds similar to the Buchanan permit. This understanding is confirmed by 
a letter received by Mr. van Frank from Orion Goff, director of the Division, explaining 
the grounds for the denial of the permit. The letter states that the Division's staff made a 
"judgment call" based on Utah Administrative Rule 156-3a-102 that Mr. van Frank's 
work exceeded the scope of incidental engineering work allowed an architect. 
Response: The letter ("Goff Letter" R. 87-89) referenced by Mr. van Frank is 
hearsay, it discusses a totally different project for a totally different client, and was 
written one year prior to the events at issue in this litigation. This letter has no relevance < 
to the issues before the court on summary judgment. Further, Mr. van Frank never 
disclosed this letter to the City prior to opposing the City's summary judgment motion, 
i 
and he cannot rely on it in his attempt to defeat summary judgment. Finally, Mr. van 
3 
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Frank's assertions regarding the relevance of this letter to the issues in this litigation are 
conclusory, and based solely on "understandings," "inferences" and "assumptions." This 
letter should be stricken, or at the very least, disregarded by the Court. 
Paragraph 10: After the Division denied the permit, Mr. Buchanan obtained the 
opinion of a structural engineer, which certified that the calculations made by Mr. van 
Frank were, in fact, accurate and safe. 
Response: As stated in the City's Response to Paragraph 7, the factual record 
demonstrates, at best, that "Mr. Buchannan obtained the required opinion of a structural 
engineer certifying that the floor system designed by Mr. van Frank was safe." R. 53. 
Paragraph 11: The Division then issued Mr. Buchanan's permit, requiring no 
alteration of Mr. van Frank's plans, once the engineer's opinion confirmed the 
engineering calculations that Mr. van Frank included on the plans. 
Response: See Response to Paragraph 10. 
Paragraph 14: State law also provides that DOPL has exclusive authority to make 
determinations as to whether an architect's engineering work is incidental to the practice 
of architecture. 
Response: This is a statement of legal opinion, not fact. As such, it has no place 
in a statement of undisputed fact. Further, this statement of fact is irrelevant to the issues 
before this Court. The statutory provision cited is limited to action taken on a 
professional license, not to municipal decisions made in conjunction with an application 
for a building permit. 
4 
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Paragraph 15: The regulation cited in Mr. Goff s letter was adopted by DOPL, 
expressly and solely for its use.
 ? 
Response: See the City's Responses to Paragraphs 9 and 14. 
Paragraph 17: Nothing in Title 18 or elsewhere in the City Ordinances grants the 
Division authority to determine or make judgment calls as to whether an architect 
exceeded the permissible scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed a licensed 
architect under Utah law. 
Response: This is a statement of legal opinion, not fact. As such, it has no place 
in a statement of undisputed fact. It is also argumentative. See also the City's Responses 
to Paragraphs 7, 9 and 14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in the City's favor. In order to 
hold a municipality liable for civil rights violations, a plaintiff must allege and prove the 
existence of a municipal policy, custom or practice which contributed to the alleged 
i 
constitutional violation. Mr. van Frank apparently conflates the two distinct concepts of 
alleging the existence of a municipal policy, practice or custom, versus proving the 
i 
existence of such a policy, practice or custom. Here, Mr. van Frank not only failed to 
allege the existence of such a policy in this Complaint, he further failed to prove the 
existence of a policy. < 
Mr. van Frank's civil rights claims further fail because no due process violation 
occurred. The City did not attempt to suspend or revoke Mr. van Frank's license as an 
i 
architect, nor has it ever taken any action against Mr. van Frank's licensure status with 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DOPL. It appears that the basis for Mr. van Frank's claims stem from a claimed right to 
the approval of his plans in connection with his client's application for a building permit. 
However, Utah case law is clear that municipal land use decisions and planning disputes 
are primarily a matter of local government concern and do not implicate the Constitution. 
Cities are entitled to exercise discretion in interpreting land use statutes, ordinances and 
rules. Due to the complexity of factors involved and the necessary application of 
specialized knowledge to the circumstances in land use matters, a city's land use 
decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference. 
Mr. van Frank has no right or entitlement to the approval of his plans, calculations, 
or the building permit application of his client. His allegations do not amount to any 
deprivation or inability to practice architecture. His disagreement with the City merely 
involves a dispute about the design details of his client's application, and in no way 
deprives him of any constitutionally protected property right. Being an architect is an 
occupation; having the state-granted privilege to also engage in the incidental practice of 
engineering is not. Here, Mr. van Frank has not been foreclosed form practicing 
architecture. 
Mr. van Frank was not entitled to due process in the permit application process. 
He has no legitimate claim of entitlement of approval of a building permit. Further, City 
Code provided Mr. van Frank with the ability to appeal the City's decision, an 
opportunity he declined to take advantage of. Under state law, a person may not 
challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision until that person has 
exhausted his administrative remedies. 
6 
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The code sections and administrative rules cited by Mr. van Frank in support of 
his claims do not apply to the City in the land use context. His allegations, by his own 
admission, are based upon his "understanding" and "assumption" of the grounds for the 
City's conditional denial of the building permit. Understandings and assumptions are not 
admissible evidence, and are insufficient to create a material issue of fact in opposition to 
summary judgment. No admissible evidence exists that even suggests that the City took 
any action with regard to Mr. van Frank's licensure as an architect. 
Mr. van Frank erroneously claims that the trial court determined that the Goff 
Letter was inadmissible hearsay, and that his declaration was not properly supported for 
the purposes of summary judgment. The trial court made no such determinations. The 
trial court merely noted the City's objections to Mr. van Frank's use of these documents 
in opposition to summary judgment, but it did not rule on those objections. Indeed, the 
trial court did consider the Goff Letter, over the City's objections, in reaching the 
conclusion that it did not constitute evidence of a City policy. 
The trial court properly denied injunctive relief. Mr. van Frank failed to 
demonstrate a realistic probability of the same injurious conduct in the future. Setting 
forth only two occasions among the thousands of other land use decisions made by the 
City, and with respect to the universe of other licensed architects whose clients may seek 
a building permit from the City, was insufficient to meet the required demonstration. 
Even if Mr. van Frank could establish standing for injunctive relief, he would fail on the 
merits pursuant to the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 65 A(e). 
7 
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Finally, the trial court was correct to deny Mr. van Frank's request for a new trial 
or for reconsideration. Based on the reasons set forth above, and in light of the trial 
court's ruling, the motion was not well-taken substantively. Procedurally it was properly 
denied because post-judgment motions for reconsideration have been absolutely rejected 
in Utah. Here, Mr. van Frank's memorandum simply rehashed arguments already raised 
and argued to the trial court, requested that the trial court "reconsider" its summary 
judgment ruling seven different times, while mentioning a new trial only once. It did not 
apply or analyze any of Rule 59's provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE CITY5 S FAVOR. 
A. MR. VAN FRANK NEVER ALLEGED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY 
CITY POLICY, PRACTICE OR CUSTOM THAT CONTRIBUTED 
IN ANY WAY TO THE ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS. 
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that municipalities and their employees may be held liable for civil 
right violations only when a plaintiff alleges and can demonstrate "the action that is 
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 
690-91. In Monell and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has "required a plaintiff 
seeking to impose liability on a municipality to identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' 
that caused the plaintiffs injury." Bd. Of County Coram 'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 
(1997); Allison v. Utah County Corp., 335 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1318 (D.Utah 2004). 
8 
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In his brief, Mr. van Frank conflates the two distinct concepts of alleging the 
existence of a municipal policy, practice or custom, versus proving the existence of such 
a policy, practice or custom. Here, the trial court properly found that he failed to allege 
the existence of any City policy, as required under federal law to assert a § 1983 claim 
against a municipality. Nowhere in Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint does he allege 
the existence of any City policy, practice or custom that contributed in any way to any 
claimed constitutional violation. Because he failed to allege the existence of a City 
policy in his Amended Complaint, all of his efforts to demonstrate that he proved the 
existence of a City policy avail him nothing. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep 7 ofSoc. Svcs., 436 
U.S. 658 (1978); Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007); Myers 
v. Okla. County Bd. OfCommrs., 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998). 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court properly determined that Mr. van 
Frank never alleged in his Complaint that any policy, practice or custom of the City led to 
the claimed constitutional violations. It was not until he filed his memorandum opposing 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment that he claimed the existence of a City policy 
based on a letter written by Orion Goff one year prior to the events at issue in this 
litigation. This letter had never been disclosed to the City prior to opposing summary 
judgment, and it had absolutely nothing to do with the facts and circumstances of the 
present lawsuit. Even though this letter was hearsay, irrelevant and inadmissible, the trial 
court did not explicitly exclude it from consideration. Instead, the trial court found that at 
most, Mr. van Frank was alleging that the City made decisions on two occasions that he 
exceeded the scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under state 
9 
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law, but that these two decisions did not constitute a deprivation of his right to practice 
his occupation as an architect. The court's determination that Mr. van Frank failed to 
state a claim should be affirmed. 
B. MR. VAN FRANK FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
Mr. van Frank fails to identify any federal Constitutional or statutory basis for his 
allegations and causes of action. In conclusory and general terms, he claims that his 
rights to "due process" have been violated based on alleged violations of state law and 
administrative rules. It is clear, however, that "[a]n action under § 1983 . . . cannot be 
maintained on the basis of alleged violation of state law," including a violation of a state 
constitutional right. Stanko v. Maher, 419 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005); Becker v. 
Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 917 (10th Cir. 2007); Redwood Professional Plaza, L.C v. City of 
West Jordan, 2009 WL 1408217, case no. 1:07-CV-153TC (D. Utah 2009). 
While the basis for his constitutional claims are not entirely clear, Mr. van Frank 
apparently demands judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not create any 
substantive rights by itself. Rather, it provides a remedy for violation of an existing 
federal Constitutional or statutory right caused by an action taken under color of state 
law. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). To state a valid claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove two elements: (1) that defendant has 
deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States, and 
(2) that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under "color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." Trujillo v. Goodman, 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
825 F.2d 1453, 1456-7 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). "Where a right or immunity 
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States is an essential element of the 
cause of action, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to adequately and properly allege 
jurisdictional facts according to the nature of the case." Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 
879 (10th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held that "section 1983 imposes liability for 
violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care 
arising out of tort law." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). Tort claims such 
as interference with business relations and defamation, which are essentially what van 
Frank alleges here, do not give rise to any cause of action for violation of due process 
under § 19831. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 
711-12 (1976); Kenman Engg v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 481 (10th Cir. 2002). 
C. NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OCCURRED 
Even if this Court determines that Mr. van Frank did properly allege and prove the 
existence of a municipal policy, his claims still fail because the City did not violate his 
due process rights under the state or federal constitutions. 
L NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY 
RIGHT IS AT STAKE, 
The "property right" asserted by Mr. van Frank is not entirely clear. While he 
claims that the City has denied him the "ability to practice his profession" as an architect, 
1
 Even if there were a § 1983 cause of action for defamation, it would be barred here by 
Utah's one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-
302(4). Mr. van Frank alleges actions that occurred in June of 2007, and his Complaint 
was not filed until September 12, 2008. 
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it is undisputed that the City did not revoke or suspend his architect's license. The City 
has no such authority. It is further undisputed that the City has taken no action 
whatsoever with regard to Mr. van Frank's licensure status with DOPL. To the best of 
the City's knowledge, Mr. van Frank is still a licensed architect. Any property right he 
has to practice his profession has not been deprived by the City in any manner. 
Rather, it appears that Mr. van Frank claims a property right in the approval of his 
plans and engineering calculations, which were attached to his client's application for a 
building permit. Denial of the application, according to Mr. van Frank, requires the City 
to provide him an opportunity to "defend and explain his work before it was arbitrarily 
rejected." By "rejecting his plans," the City "denied Mr. van Frank's right to practice 
architecture," "damaged van Frank's economic relationship with his client," and 
"damaged his reputation." 
This argument fails for several reasons. First, to plead a cognizable substantive 
due process claim, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient facts to show a property or liberty 
interest warranting due process protection." Crider v. Bd. Of County Comm 'rs, 246 F.3d 
1285, 1289 (10 Cir. 2001). In the context of due process, property is "a 'legitimate 
claim of entitlement' to some benefit." Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 
F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). Significantly, however, a protectable property interest 
is not created by an "abstract need for, or unilateral expectation of, a benefit." Id. 
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "[m]any courts have held that adverse 
municipal land-use decisions are not actionable under § 1983 because a developer does 
not typically have a claim of entitlement to a favorable decision." Patterson v. American 
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Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ^ 24, 67 P.3d 466. A city's rejection of a developer's application 
"does not always amount to a violation of section 1983 because every planning dispute 
'necessarily involves some claim that the [municipality] exceeded, abused or 'distorted' 
its legal authority in some manner . . . It is not enough simply to give these state law 
claims constitutional labels such as 'due process' . . . in order to raise a substantial federal 
question under section 1983." Id. at ^ 25 (quoting Creative Environments, Inc. v. 
Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982). Just as in Patterson, van Frank's claims are 
merely a "conventional planning dispute . . . [which] is a matter primarily of concern to 
the state and does not implicate the Constitution." Id. 
Cities are entitled to exercise discretion in interpreting land use statutes, 
ordinances and rules. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-802(2), 10-9a-801, 10-9a-501, 58-56-
8(1), 58-56-20(3)(d); Salt Lake City Code 18.04.030, 18.04.040, 18.08.020, 18.20.040; 
Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, 26 P.3d 193; Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn. 
v. Bd. OfCommrs. Of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979); Redwood 
Professional Plaza v. City of West Jordan, 2009 WL 5195776 (D. Utah 2009). Due to 
the complexity of factors involved and the necessary application of specialized 
knowledge in land use matters, a city's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of 
deference. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984); Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966). Indeed, under state law, Utah 
courts "shall presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority 
of this chapter is valid; and determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i) and 
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(ii). A City employee's exercise of that lawful discretion does not constitute a municipal 
"policy" for § 1983 actions. On this basis alone, Mr. van Frank's claims fail. 
Second, Mr. van Frank points to no source of state or local law which entitles him 
to approval of his plans/calculations. While state law may allow a licensed architect the 
right to engage in the incidental practice of engineering, no authority exists to even 
suggest that he has a vested property right in the approval of any such calculations in 
support of an application for a building permit. Again, Mr. van Frank's complaints 
involve a dispute about local development issues, not the deprivation of constitutional 
rights. His complaints do not involve a complete inability to practice architecture. His 
disagreement with the City concerning the design details of his architectural plans in no 
way deprives him of any constitutionally protected property right. 
Further, an architect's state-created "right" to engage in the incidental practice of 
engineering is not an occupation; it is, at best, a privilege attached to an occupation. 
Limitation of that privilege, without a deprivation of the occupation, is not a deprivation 
of any claimed occupational property interest. Being an architect is an occupation; 
having the privilege to also engage in the incidental practice of engineering is not. Here, 
Mr. van Frank has not been foreclosed from practicing architecture, and he has not stated 
a deprivation of any protected property interest under § 1983. 
Finally, Mr. van Frank's allegations of damage to his professional reputation and 
relationships with clients are not actionable. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that damage to reputation alone is not a sufficient interest to establish a claim of denial of 
due process under § 1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). This type of claim 
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is a "classical claim for defamation." Id. at 697. As such, state tort law provides 
adequate protection. As the Court has stressed repeatedly, § 1983 was not meant to 
federalize state tort law. Id. at 701 (the Due Process Clause is not a "font of tort law to be 
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States"); 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ("the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.. . does not transform every tort 
committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation"). The Tenth Circuit has also 
made it clear that damage to "prospective employment opportunities" is too intangible to 
constitute a deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Setliffv. Memorial Hosp. of 
Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384, 1397 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1988). Thus, even if the City's 
actions made Mr. van Frank less attractive to current and potential clients, that is 
insufficient to state a deprivation of a property interest under § 1983. Id. 
jL MR. VAN FRANK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS. 
For the same reasons stated above, Mr. van Frank was not entitled to procedural 
due process. "The deprivation of a procedural right to be heard, however, is not 
actionable when there is no protected right at stake." Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 
F.3d 188, 193 (2nd Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). "Process is not an end in itself. Its 
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a 
legitimate claim of entitlement." Olimv. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). Mr. 
van Frank has no legitimate claim of entitlement to approval of a building permit based 
on the drawings, plans and/or engineering calculations he submitted in support thereof. 
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Further, City Code provided Mr. van Frank with an opportunity to appeal the 
City's decision. Salt Lake City Code 18.20.040 (applications for building permits must 
be accompanied by "all required plans, diagrams and other data," and "building official 
may require the plans and other data to be prepared and designed by an engineer or 
architect licensed by the state to practice as such"); 18.20.140 ("Any person adversely 
affected by the action of the building official in accordance with the preceding sections 
may appeal to the board of appeals and examiners for a hearing upon such revocation or 
denial") (emphasis added). Mr. van Frank apparently declined to avail himself of his 
appeal rights under the City Code. Under state law, "[n]o person may challenge in 
district court a municipality's land use decision made under this chapter, or under a 
regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the 
person's administrative remedies . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l). 
Finally, Mr. van Frank has no substantive due process claim. Substantive due 
process protects only "fundamental rights," which are "rights created by the 
Constitution." Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 
(11th Cir. 2003); see also Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006) 
("Substantive due process claims are not based on state law but are founded upon deeply 
rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution."). The 
Due Process Clause "prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the 
conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). "The standard forjudging a substantive due 
process claim is whether the challenged government action would 'shock the conscience 
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of federal judges/" Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2001). 
"[PJlaintiff must do more than show the government actor intentionally or recklessly 
caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power . . . it must 
demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that 
is truly conscience shocking." Id. (quoting Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. Of Regents, 159 
F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Mr. van Frank has failed to demonstrate through any competent evidence that the 
City's alleged actions in this matter constituted a violation of his substantive due process 
rights. Nothing about the facts alleged herein would shock the conscience of any 
reasonable person. 
]iL THE CODE SECTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
CITED BY MR. VAN FRANK DO NOT APPLY HERE. THE 
CITY TOOK NO ACTION WHATSOEVER TO ENFORCE 
STATE LICENSURE LAWS, OR MADE ANY 
DETERMINATION REGARDING MR. VAN FRANK'S 
ARCHITECT LICENSE. 
The Division's conditional denial of Mr. Buchanan's application for a building 
permit was a municipal land use decision. It had nothing to do with Mr. van Frank's 
licensure as an architect. Title 58 of the Utah Code, and Utah Administrative Rule R156-
3a-102, have no application to the City here. Title 58, "Occupations and Professions," 
creates DOPL within the Utah Department of Commerce. U.C.A. § 58-1-103. Among 
DOPL's statutory duties is the responsibility for "prescribing, adopting, and enforcing 
rules to administer this title." U.C.A. § 58-1-106(1 )(a). Pursuant to this authority, DOPL 
adopted R156-1-101 et seq of the Utah Administrative Code. R156-1-103, titled 
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"Authority—Purpose," states: "This rule is adopted by the division [DOPL] under the 
authority of Subsection 58-l-106(l)(a) to enable the division to administer Title 58." 
R156-3a-103, which addresses regulation of architects, states: "This rule is adopted by 
the division [DOPL] under the authority of Subsection 58-1-106(1 )(a) to enable the 
division to administer Title 58, Chapter 3a." These Rules clearly apply only to DOPL, 
not the City. 
Mr. van Frank plainly admits that his allegations are based entirely upon his 
understanding and assumption that the Division's grounds for conditional denial were 
"similar, if not identical to the grounds set forth" in a letter that is totally unrelated to the 
facts and circumstances in this case. Understandings and assumptions are not admissible 
evidence, and cannot be relied upon to support a summary judgment motion. "Bare 
allegations, unsupported by specific facts in support thereof, do not raise material issues 
of fact. Massey v. Utah Power and Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980); See also 
Briscoe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), affd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Davis v. 
Lukens, No. 91-1020-K, 1991 WL 126729 (D. Kan. June 12, 1991) (legal conclusions, 
deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations not given any presumption of 
truthfulness in determining a motion to dismiss). 
The letter relied upon by Mr. van Frank was written a year prior to the events at 
issue here, involved a completely different project for a "Mr. Thomas," and has no 
relevance whatsoever to the facts and circumstances before this court. It lacks foundation 
and is hearsay. Further, even if it were admissible, Mr. van Frank has never disclosed 
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this letter to the City, and cannot now rely on it in support of his summary judgment 
motion. This letter should be stricken, or at the very least, disregarded by the court. 
Similarly, Mr. van Frank concedes that the Division is authorized to question plans 
if it has safety concerns, but claims, without support, that no such concerns were 
expressed in this matter. This is in direct contradiction with the allegations in paragraphs 
9, 13 and 27 of his Amended Complaint2, and his Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 9 in 
opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment3. Mr. van Frank further 
conceded the City's Statements of Undisputed Fact Nos. 5 and 6 in its summary 
judgment Memorandum, which clearly stated that Mr. Buchanan's application for a 
building permit was conditionally denied based, at least in part, on safety concerns4. 
~ Paragraph 9 of Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint alleges "In addition to denying the 
permit, the Division required Mr. Buchanan or his contractor to provide a structural 
engineer's opinion certifying that the calculations shown on the plans were correct and/or 
certifying that the design for the floor system was sound," i.e. safe. 
Paragraph 13 of Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint alleges "After discussing 
the matter with Plaintiff, the owner, Mr. Buchanan . . . obtained the opinion of a
 ( 
structural engineer that the floor system designed by Plaintiff was sound and/or that the 
calculations Plaintiff had performed accurately showed that the floor system was 
adequate to support the loads required to be supported under the building codes." 
Paragraph 27 of Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint alleges "In both instances, 
the Defendant failed to conduct any analysis supporting any finding that Plaintiff could < 
not safely and competently perform the calculations challenged by the Division . . ." 
3
 Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 9 states "After the denial of the permit by the 
Division, Mr. Buchanan obtained the opinion of a structural engineer certifying that the 
calculations made by Mr. van Frank were, in fact, accurate and hence safe." 
4
 The City's Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 5 stated "Mr. Buchanan's application for a i 
building permit was denied, at least in part, because the City required a structural 
engineer's opinion regarding certain calculations made by van Frank in his drawings 
and/or certifying the safety of the building design." 
The City's Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 6 stated "Mr. Buchanan obtained the 
required opinion of a structural engineer certifying that the floor system designed by Mr. ' 
van Frank was safe." 
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In conclusory fashion, Mr. van Frank claims that "it is apparent that these plans 
were safe and complied with the building code," "the Division must accept plans stamped 
by a licensed architect" where there are no conflicts with the building code, the Division 
must "pass on any concerns it may have regarding the scope of work done by an 
architect" to DOPL, and the Division "exceeded its authority in making its 'judgment 
call.'" No admissible facts are provided in support, nor is any legal analysis undertaken. 
Contrary to van Frank's conclusory assertions, the City has taken no action with 
regard to his licensure as an architect. Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3a-102, and the 
administrative rules enacted pursuant to thereto, have no application here. The City has 
not assumed any duties of the Architect's Licensing Board or DOPL. The City's actions, 
as alleged here, clearly only pertain to the sufficiency of Mr. Buchanan's application for a 
building permit, and have nothing to do with Mr. van Frank's licensure status as an 
architect. Mr. van Frank's licensure status with DOPL is entirely unaffected by the 
City's denial of Mr. Buchanan's application for a building permit. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE THE GOFF LETTER OR MR. 
VAN FRANK'S DECLARATION. 
Mr. van Frank incorrectly asserts that the trial court determined that the Goff 
Letter (R.87-89) was inadmissible hearsay (van Frank Brief, Part II), and that his 
declaration (R. 121-24) was not properly supported for the purposes of summary 
judgment (van Frank Brief, Part V). The trial court made no such determinations. While 
noting in its Memorandum Decision the City's objections to the Goff Letter and Mr. van 
Frank's declaration, the court nevertheless proceeded to consider the Goff Letter as 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence of the City's land use decisions, not as City policies. R. 240-41. Even if the 
Goff Letter was evidence of the City's land use decisions, Mr. van Frank did not allege or 
prove the existence of any City policy of depriving a right to practice architecture, and 
therefore failed to state a claim for municipal liability. Id. 
The same is true for Mr. van Frank's declaration. The trial court noted the City's 
objections to the opinions stated in the declaration (R. 244-45), but did not rule on them. 
Instead, the court indicated that it "would be compelled to deny Mr. van Frank's motion 
on the bases of these factual disputes. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in 
connection with its analysis of the City's motion for summary judgment, it also 
determines that as a matter of law, Mr. van Frank is not entitled to summary judgment." 
R. 245. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MR. VAN FRANK'S 
REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
The trial court properly found that Mr. van Frank failed to demonstrate a realistic 
probability that the City would subject him to the same injurious conduct in the future. 
Indeed, Mr. van Frank set forth only two occasions (at best) out of the thousands of other 
land use decisions made by the City where he claimed injurious conduct. This was 
insufficient to demonstrate a sufficient probability that the City would do so again, both 
with respect to Mr. van Frank, and with respect to the universe of other licensed 
architects whose clients may seek a building permit from the City. 
In addition, even if Mr. van Frank could establish standing for injunctive relief, he 
cannot meet any of the requirements for injunctive relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
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65A(e). As the trial court ruled, he has not suffered any cognizable injury under § 1983, 
and there is no likelihood of his success on the merits. Further, an injunction against the 
City would result in substantial damage to the City and would be adverse to the public 
interest. In situations such as this, where the Division has safety concerns about plans 
submitted in support of applications for land use permits, the approval process would 
grind to a halt if the Division were required to refer all decisions to DOPL. Adequate 
protections are already available to any person who is adversely affected by an adverse 
decision through the City's appeal process. Salt Lake City Code 18.20.140. Because he 
failed to avail himself of his appeal rights, Mr. van Frank cannot now seek judicial relief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MR. VAN FRANK'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RECONSIDER. 
For all the reasons set forth above, the trial court correctly held that Mr. van 
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider was not well-taken substantively. From a 
procedural standpoint, it was also properly denied. The Utah Supreme Court has 
"absolutely rejected] the practice of filing post-judgment motions to reconsider." Gillett 
v. Price, 2006 UT 24, \ 1, 135 P.3d 861. Mr. van Frank's motion, although styled in the 
alternative as a motion for a new trial, was in every other respect a motion to reconsider. 
Indeed, the text of Mr. van Frank's memorandum in support of his motion specifically 
asked the trial court to "reconsider" its ruling on summary judgment seven different 
times, while mentioning a "new trial" only once. Mr. van Frank's memorandum did not 
cite, or even mention, U.R.C.P. Rule 59 even once. It did not apply or analyze any of 
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Rule 59's provisions. "Mere recitation of rule 59 does not convert a motion to reconsider 
into a legitimate motion for new trial." Cline v. State of Utah, 2007 UT App 111, 2007 
WL 1017372. The total lack of substantive argument compelled the court's conclusion 
that the motion did not qualify as a Rule 59 motion. 
At the outset of his argument section, Mr. van Frank set forth the wrong standard 
for a "Motion to Reconsider." Because his was a postjudgment motion from a final 
order, his reliance on Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) was entirely misplaced. Unlike here, the Trembly decision involved a non-
final order. 
Mr. van Frank' motion did nothing more than challenge the district court's 
reasoning in its Memorandum Decision. He identified no new case law applicable to the 
facts, nor any error of law committed by the trial court that was not already argued on 
summary judgment. Instead, he re-hashed the same arguments already presented to the 
court, and argued issues of fact, which were not a basis for asserting a Rule 59 motion. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision denying Mr. van Frank's 
Motion to Reconsider. 
CONCLUSION l 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the City's 
favor. Mr. van Frank never alleged the existence of any city policy, custom or practice 4 
that contributed in any way to the alleged constitutional violations. He also failed to 
prove the existence of any such policy. No due process violation occurred because Mr. 
i 
van Frank did not have any constitutionally protected property right at stake, he was not 
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entitled to due process in the context of the City's municipal land use decision, and even 
if he was, the City Code provided Mr. van Frank with an opportunity to appeal the City's 
decision. He declined to do so. 
The City took no action whatsoever against Mr. van Frank's licensure as an 
architect. The state code sections and administrative rules cited by Mr. van Frank do not 
apply to the City's municipal land use decisions. His licensure status with DOPL is 
entirely unaffected by the City's denial of Mr. Buchanan's application for a building 
permit. 
Contrary to his assertions, the trial court did not rule on the sufficiency and/or 
admissibility of the Goff Letter or Mr. van Frank's declaration. The trial court's 
Memorandum Decision merely noted the City's objections to Mr. van Frank's use of 
those documents in opposition to summary judgment, and in support of his own summary 
judgment motion. 
The trial court correctly denied Mr. van Frank's request for injunctive relief. He 
failed to demonstrate a realistic probability that the City would subject him, or anyone 
else, to the same injurious conduct in the future. Having set forth only two occasions (at 
best) out of the thousands of other land use decisions made by the City, and with respect 
to the universe of other licensed architects whose clients may seek a building permit from 
the City, the trial court correctly held that he lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief. 
In addition, even if he could establish standing, he could not meet any of the 
requirements for injunctive relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e). 
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Finally, Mr. van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to Reconsider was properly 
denied. The motion was not well-taken, both substantively and procedurally. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation 
respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in its favor. 
Dated this day of July, 2011. 
$ [Mi^^A^m, uCffibn-
J. WESLEY ROBINSON / 
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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